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ABSTRACT 
Over the last decades, we have seen several policy models, 
including role-based access control and more recently, certificate-
base control. These models are based on the important notion 
“flow relation”. In this work, we present a logical language of 
certificate-based access control. Our model presents the formal 
method of reasoning for discretionary access and defines logic to 
express a discretionary policy. We introduce, instead, material 
implication widely used in mathematics, and we show in a case 
study its ease in every sense. We find it allows the policy 
specifications to be interpreted more conveniently by practitioners 
and implemented in a simple way. Our evaluation shows that 
policies defined with material implication can be used for creation 
of the specification of a trust relationships policy and for checking 
safety of any computer system. 
CCS Concepts 
• Security and privacy~Access control        
   • Security and privacy~Information flow control 
      • Security and privacy~Software security engineering. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Monitoring of access is understood as methods or mechanisms 
which define whether the request for access to any resource shall 
be resolved or forbidden. It is known that each distributed access 
control system should contain an information protection 
subsystem, which must be based on precisely defined 
mathematical models for controlling access to this information.  
In our article we propose the flow-based logic model for 
interpreting the basic events and properties of the distributed 
access control systems. Our goal is to develop the logic and the 
formal language that can be used for making a security policy 
specification and for checking any computer system security. We 
can prove some important properties of this logic and show on a 
case study how our logical language can express some access 
control policies proposed so far. This can be achieved with 
introducing certificates. The certificate-based access control is 
aimed at specifying security policies for access to resources from 
untrusted sources, e.g. via the Internet. 
Recently, the work on logic-based access models and certificate-
based authorization has been intensified. Formal reasoning 
techniques on security models and access policy specifications 
have been presented, e.g. [15]. These models are usually based 
on the modal logic and cannot be automated in a simple way. The 
logic-based approaches generally fail to directly map to an 
implementation and are not easily interpreted by practitioners. It is 
intuitively clear that a system with total security is a system that 
does not allow the information flows among its users. Thus, the 
system is called safe under a certain policy if all its transactions 
are confirmed with an ideal security system, except for permitted 
in policy. 
 
2.  LOGICAL MODEL 
It is known that the permitted flow of information in a system can 
naturally be represented as a lattice-ordered set, (S, ), where S is 
a given  set of security  classes  and «» is a flow relation 
specifying  permissible flows between pairs of classes [6]. Objects 
are bound to these security classes.  Information may flow from 
object x to y through any sequence of operations if and only if 
     B, where A and B are the objects’ security classes. 
Information can be passed by copying, assignment, I/O, parameter 
passing, message sending, etc. We concerned with information 
flow on “legitimate” and “storage” channels, not “covert” 
channels. Binding of objects to security classes can be static or 
dynamic. With static binding, the security class of an object never 
changes. With dynamic binding, the object’s security class can 
change based on the content of the object. A process can also be 
bound to a security class. 
A lattice-ordered set is a poset (S, ) in which each two-element 
subset {x, y} has a greatest lower bound, denoted inf{x,y}, and a 
  
least upper bound, denoted sup{x,y}. Lattice-ordered sets abound 
in mathematics and its applications. 
Let A and B be security classes. A  B refers to the security class 
of the result of any binary function on values x and y (x = A, y = 
B). Operator  is function independent.  
Under the reasonable assumptions that there is a finite number of 
security classes, that the flow relation is reflexive, and that the 
flow relation is transitive, we may suppose that (S, ) is a lattice, 
       . If           is not a lattice, it may be transformed into one 
by adding new classes as necessary without changing the flows 
among the original classes. In this model, a system is secure if no 
flow of information violates the flow relation.  
 
3. DERIVATION OF LATTICE  
There is a natural relationship between lattice-ordered sets and 
lattices. Indeed, a lattice          is obtained from a lattice-
ordered poset (S, ). Suppose  =  is the relation. C is an 
upper bound of A and B if    C and    C. C is a least upper 
bound of A and B if for any upper bound D of A and B,    C. 
Lower bounds and greatest lower bounds work the same way. 
First we show that         is a poset. It is reflexive: A  A (for 
consistency sake); transitive: if A  B and B  C, then A  C 
(for consistency sake); antisymmetric: if A  B and B  A, then 
A = B (otherwise, one has a superfluous security class).  
Second, we assume S is finite because we dealing with the real 
world. Third, we can assume that x  y = inf{x,y}= L. There exists 
a greatest lower bound L on S without loss of generality. If 
needed, we can insert L with no object. Or, perhaps we could fill it 
with constant. Fourth, we can assume that x  y = sup{x,y}= H is 
a least upper bound operator for any x,y  S. 
A lattice-ordered set is bounded provided that it is a bounded 
poset, i.e., if it has an upper bound and a lower bound. For a 
bounded lattice-ordered set, the upper bound is frequently denoted 
1 and the lower bound is frequently denoted 0. Given an element x 
of a bounded lattice-ordered set (S, ), we say that x is 
complemented in (S, ) if there exists an element yS such that 
inf{x,y}= 0 and sup{x,y}= 1.  
Also, from a lattice          , one may obtain a lattice-ordered 
poset (S, ) by setting x  y iff x = x  y. One obtains the same 
lattice-ordered poset (S, ) from the given lattice by setting x  
y iff y = x  y. One may prove that for any lattice,          , 
and for any two members x and y of S, x  y = x iff y = x  y.  
Thus, we have established that           form universally 
bounded lattice with greatest lower bound L, and the least upper 
bound H. Lattices are different from a lattice-ordered sets because 
lattices are algebraic structures that form an variety, but lattice-
ordered sets are not algebraic structures, and therefore do not form 
a variety [7]. 
It is tempting to present the security objects through logical 
language. In modern times, many researchers have proposed logic 
diagrams, especially as representations of logical reasoning (e.g., 
[8]). “Diagrams are a kind of … knowledge representation 
mechanism that is characterized by correspondence between the 
structure of the representation and the structure of the 
represented” [9]. Their advantages include effective control of the 
reasoning process, and understandability by users. It is suggested 
that the ability to manipulate logic diagrams could be provided 
even to nonspecialists.   
Therefore, we saw material implication as an abstract counterpart 
of the empirical flow relation,   , and the close resemblance 
above allows modeling the flow relation in all relevant cases. It 
follows, that   y   x  y. 
4. LOGIC FORMULAE  
Consider the example (from [2]): 
•  Tipically, every student is authorized to use every device.  
• Those who have abused a device before lose access to that 
device.  
•  John is a student and a printer is device.  
•  John is authorized to use a printer. 
This access control policy can be written with flow relation, as: 
x (Student(x)    y (Device (y)  Abused (x, y))). We have  
1.   y   x  y; 
1.Student (John)  (Device (printer)  Abused (John, printer)); 
2. Device (printer)  Abused (John, printer); 
3.Abused (John, printer). 
 Student (x) receives John  means applying  John  to Student(x) 
and, according to the structure of the formula, also to Abused(x, 
y). The notion of information flow here accomplishes this notion 
of application; as in mathematics, replacing a variable by a value 
means replacing it across the equation. 
Since John is a student, he is authorized to use a printer. Using the 
symbols "1" and "0" for security classes,  authorized  or not, we 
get the truth value of Student(x) is processed according to  not  
truth table, resulting in false to   , and it is not processed further. 
On the other hand, assigning a value, say, printer, to y, causes 
replacing in Abused (John, printer). Hence, creating true in Device 
(printer) causes it to flow to    and is processed to end in 
Abused (John, printer). The resultant of the latter is false, as well 
as the example of access control policy.  
5. OPERATIONS WRITE AND READ 
The basic idea in this paper is to conceptualize the truth values as 
things that can be used as a set of functional characteristics of 
objects. This conceptualized flow is, to some degree, analogous to 
information flow. Every security object has two subspheres: the 
object itself and the truth value given its class of security. The 
truth value can flow to another term by such logical connective as 
material implication. 
The "write" operation can be interpreted as a flow of information 
to the object, as Figure 1 shows.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: The "write" operation is modeled by material 
implication between two variables, one of which is security 
level of object Om related to subject Si (writer), and another is 
security level of object Oj 
 
Then we can describe the writing and reading operations in 
notions of finite-state automata, as usual. The resultant of material 
implication is such that "1" represents “enabled”, and "0"  
“forbidden” (in the 3d column, see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Truth table for the "write" operation 
 
Om (Si) Oj Om  Oj 
0 0 1 
0 1 1 
1 0 0 
1 1 1 
 
The "read" operation can be interpreted as a flow of information 
from the object Om, as Figure 2 shows. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The "read" operation is modeled by material 
implication    between two variables, one of which is security 
level of object Om, and another is object Oj related to subject Sj 
(reader) 
Using the symbols "1" and "0" for security classes, similarly to 
the preceding case we get following truth table, see Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Truth table for the "read" operation 
Om Oj(Sj)       Om  Oj 
0 0 1 
1 0 0 
0 1 1 
1 1 1 
 
By duality we can formulate the rules of Biba integrity model, 
giving  flow relation  as  ( x  y) = x   y. For example, 
using the symbols "1" and "0" for integrity classes, where "1" 
represents, as before, a higher level of integrity than "0", a subject 
y must not read an object x at a lower integrity level, accordingly, 
a subject x at a low level of integrity must not write to any object 
y at a higher level of integrity. 
The goal, of course, of deriving this logical model is for it to help 
us enforce security. To do this, we must monitor all information 
flow causing operations. We must monitor explicit flow 
(assignment, I/O) and implicit flow. We want to represent a 
program or statement Q in a way that easily allows us to evaluate 
whether or not it is secure. Define Q recursively: Q is an 
elementary statement (assignment, I/O); Q = Q1; Q2; Q = c: Q1, 
, Qm (c is m-valued variable). 
For elementary statements, Q is secure if any explicit flow caused 
by Q is secure. For Q = Q1; Q2, Q is secure if both Q1 and Q2 are 
secure. For Q = c: Q1, , Qm, Q is secure if each Qk is secure and 
all implicit flows from c are secure.  
6. LANGUAGE OF LOGIC 
Let's enter language of our logic. First we determine atomic 
formulas on the basis of the following predicates: 
1) grant_key (K, P,   ) – the principal P grants the key K to the 
principal   . It means automatic issuing the certificate of the key 
which is valid until it is revoked. 
2) grant_right (R, P,   , O) – the principal P grants to the 
principal    the access right R to the object O. 
3) give_obright (P, O, R, A) – the principal P determines that the 
condition of using the object O with the access right R was the 
possessing of the attribute A by any subject. The statement is valid 
until it is revoked. 
4) take_key (K, P,   ) – the principal P takes from the principal    
the key K. The key K is added to the key revocation list. 
5) take_right (R, P,   , O) – the principal P takes from the 
principal Q the access right R to an object O. 
6) take_obright (P, O, R, A) – the principal P withdraws the 
condition of using the object O with the access right R and the 
attributes A from all possessing subjects. 
When considering the security properties of a distributed system it 
is convenient to use concept based on histories. The system 
interacts with its environment through events. These events 
correspond to actions, done by system or its environment. We 
define them by . Sequence of events corresponding to possible 
sequence of actions determines a history. System events are 
defined in terms of histories.  
By a local history of principal                  at the 
moment k, we mean a sequence of actions             , 
executed by the principal. Number k indicates a point of time 
(discrete time), by which     has performed the actions above. We 
denote the local history of principal     by   
 . We select the point 
k = 0, where all local histories are empty sequences. To simplify, 
we assume that all the clocks in the network are synchronized.  
Each principal     at any point of time k has:  
    
 
 
– the set that states the principal activity. This set is empty at 
the time k = 0. After the execution of action create_principal (P, 
   ), the element "+" is added to the set. After performing action 
delete_principal (P, Pm), it becomes empty, and all contents of all 
following sets are deleted.  
     
 
 
– the set of access rights to objects that     has at the point 
of time k.  After action, like grant_right (R, P,  , O), or 
take_right (R, P,  , O), each of the sets     
   
 
is enlarged or 
decreased with corresponding quadruples.  
A local state of principal     at the point of time k consists of  
1. local history   
 ,  
2. set of activities    
 ,  
3. set of keys   
 , 
4.  set of access rights    
 . 
Let us denote local principal states at the point of time k as   
 . A 
global state of principals at the point of time k represents the 
sequence of local principal states      
     
       
    
At any point of time k each object    has: 
    
 
 
– the set that states the object activity. This set is empty at 
the point of time k = 0. After the execution of action 
create_object (    ), the element "+" is added to the set. After 
performing step delete_object (      it becomes empty. After 
performing action delete_object(       all contents of all 
following set are deleted.  
     
 
 
– the set stating the conditions of use of the object On  with 
given access rights at the point of time k.     
     
 After 
executing an action like  like    
   is enlarged or decreased with 
corresponding quadruples.  
By a local state of objects at the point of time k we mean a 
sequence of pairs  
 
        
     
       
     
          
      
     
 
By global system state     we mean a pair of              . 
A run  represents any sequence of global states of a system 
 
                   
 
Program execution is a sequence of system states. In many cases a 
local state of principal is strongly associated with the available 
keys. For example, the formula "    has key K" could be written 
as follows: 
HKey( ,K)
  
  
                                                 
 
This formula means: "    has key K iff there is some principal 
which confirms that the key K belongs to principal   and nobody 
has revoked this key."  
 
7. CASE STUDY  
Let us consider a company that has information divided in two 
compartments:  
1.  ﬁnancial (e.g., product pricing)  
2.  product (e.g., product designs).  
Each file in the computer system is labeled to belong to one of 
these compartments. Every principal is given a clearance for one 
or both compartments. For example, the company’s policy might 
be as follows: the company accounts have clearance for reading 
and writing files in the financial compartment, the company 
engineers have clearance for reading and writing files in the 
product compartment, and the company product managers have 
clearance for reading and writing files in both compartments. 
The principals of the system interact with the files through 
programs, which are untrusted. We want ensure that information 
flows only to the company’s policy. To achieve this goal, every 
subject records the labels of the compartments for which the 
principal is cleared; this clearance is stored in Slseen. Furthermore, 
the system remembers the maximum compartment label of data 
the subject has seen, Slmax. Now the information flow control rules 
can be implemented as follows.  
In our interpretation the read rule is: 
•  Before reading an object with labels O, check that  
 
         . 
 
•  If so, set                , and allow access.  
The subject is not allowed to have access to information in 
compartments for which it has no clearance. 
Also in our interpretation the corresponding write rule is:  
•  Allow a write to an object with clearance O only if    
 
          . 
 
Every object written by a subject that read data in compartments L 
must be labeled with L’s labels. This rule ensures that if a subject 
S has read information in a compartment other than the ones listed 
in L than that information doesn’t leak into the object O. 
These information rules can be used to implement a wide range of 
policies. For example, the company can create more 
compartments, more principals, or modify the list of 
compartments a principal has clearance for. These changes in 
policy don’t require changes in the information flow rules. The 
standard policy of discretionary access claims that an object can 
be read only by those principals which have access rights on 
reading for this object [10].  
These requirements can be written in our logic. Let's denote  
 
                  
 
a flow of information from object    to object   , as Figure 2 
shows. In the definition it is stressed that a flow of information is 
not between subject and object, but only between two objects, for 
example, those related by input-output operations. The active role 
of a subject is expressed in the realization of this stream (this 
operation is localized in a subject, and displayed in a state of its 
associated objects). From the logical point of view operation 
                 can be represented in the case of reading, 
as 
     , 
 
where the arrow expresses material implication. The object   , 
associated with the subject   , after read operation, has the 
security level:         . For write operation, we have also, 
as Figure 1 shows: 
     . 
 
These operations can be represented as predicates: 
give_access (R,  , P, O) 
  
 
                                                               
 
This formula means:"   has an access to object O iff there is some 
principal which confirms that the right R belongs to principal   
and nobody has revoked this right." It is easy to see that the 
function                     is simulated in the case of read 
operation, R =      , as Figure 2 shows, 
                                 , 
 
or write operation, R =      , 
                                  , 
as Figure 1 shows, where    and    say for security levels of 
corresponding objects. We can also extend these formulas to the 
case of multiple reads of object    or writes to object   . 
 
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
By access control we understand methods or mechanisms that 
decide whether requests to access some resource should be 
granted or denied. For example, operating systems need to control 
which subjects and applications can read, write, or delete which 
ﬁles; managers need to control which employees can perform 
which workﬂows within an organization. Prior forms of policy, 
such as access control matrix, allow you to specify only the access 
requests should be granted. Other queries were then denied. This 
approach does not allow the administration explicitly uphold 
access rights and restrictions. The language must support the 
ability to explicitly express both permissions and prohibitions. 
Originally, the languages of access control were invented driven 
by certain application; for example, operating systems. This led to 
the redundancy of effort in design. A language of access control 
should therefore support the deeper layer [11] that encapsulates 
domain-speciﬁc structure, assumptions, or knowledge. Its 
composition mechanisms should so facilitate the applicability of 
access control patterns across application domains. 
In this paper, we have considered the development of information 
security model, derived from the discretionary security model. 
Our model represents the formal method of reasoning for 
discretionary model (we read that as well for other models, for 
example, role access control) and defines logic to formalize a 
discretionary policy, and also offers a decision algorithm which 
can be used for check by a direct and automatic method of 
coherence of a policy of access or its logical investigations. 
We have deﬁned a language for certificate-based access control 
based on Boolean logic, and shown that it thoroughly handles 
problems in security models. The analysis was shown to reduce to 
validity checks in propositional logic, and we support it with 
assume-guarantee reasoning. We have shown how the use of our 
language can help in the analysis of sertificate-based policies and 
of policies for discretionary access. 
We reiterate key elements of our work. By basing our language on 
classical Boolean logic, the properties of security classes and 
precise structure of accesses can be expressed as simple, purely 
result of evaluation of propositional forms. We give case study for 
the use of such a context for the purpose of illustration. 
The logic which we offer is powerful, indicative and allows 
creating and using simple expressions even with qualifiers.  
The offered logic has the expressiveness of the first-order logic. 
Analysis methods on the basis of this logic can be used at a design 
stage and checks of any computer network access. 
Practical systems need access and logical control. Offering a 
logical model, the authors proceeded from the fact that the main 
purpose of information security models  provide formalization of 
security policies. The more general models of information flows 
and finite automata were used for a description of information 
security models. 
In summary, the use of logic functions for the formulation of 
information security requirements makes it possible to use the 
developed apparatus of mathematical logic to determine the 
correct implementation of security policies in each specific case.  
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